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I. INTRODUCTION
Shareholders hold a financial stake in a corporation, and therefore are
often viewed as owners of the corporation and believed to be in control
for all corporate actions.1 However, their powers are circumscribed. Board 
of directors committees nominate directors to serve the corporation and 
these directors have the power to select the corporation’s officers.2 The
committees provide shareholders a slate of proposed directors that are
voted on and approved at the annual shareholder meeting.3 Shareholders 
may also propose their own slate of directors, but this typically requires a
proxy contest, which can be expensive due to the costs both associated with 
preparing and mailing documents and complying with legal requirements.4 
Prior to the 1980s, a system of managerial capitalism existed where 
managers, consisting of directors and officers, mainly controlled United 
States (“U.S.”) firms.5 Shareholders were dispersed geographically and only
owned small amounts of shares in a number of corporations.6 Shareholders
were mostly content with the system in place and voted in favor of directors
proposed by the corporation’s board.7 However, as institutional investor
 1. See The Nominating Process and Corporate Governance Committees: Principles




 3. See id. at 5.
 4. See Mark D. Gerstein et al., Activists in Your Boardroom: Planning for and Managing 
the New Dynamic, CORP. COUNS. (Aug. 21, 2016, 12:00 AM), http://www.corpcounsel.com/ 
id=1202766413580/Activists-in-Your-Boardroom-Planning-for-and-Managing-the-New­
Dynamic?slreturn=20170027185848 [https://perma.cc/T98V-5JYX]. 
5. See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 
37 J. CORP. L. 265, 267 (2012). 
6. See id.
 7. See generally id.
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ownership increased, this system changed.8 Institutional investors, primarily
insurance companies, banks, mutual funds, and similar businesses, began
increasingly investing in shares for the benefit of individuals who placed
funds with them–the beneficiaries.9 As a result, a small group of 
institutions soon acquired substantial portions of shares in public corporations.10 
Thus, a system of “investor capitalism” emerged with power gradually
shifting from the managers to the institutional shareholders.11 
Investor capitalism attained legitimacy from scholarly writings in the 
1970s that argued corporations would become more efficient if they 
prioritized shareholders’ interests.12 These scholars viewed shareholders 
as the principals of the corporation and managers as their agents, a view
referred to as “agency theory.”13 Accordingly, in an effort to provide
shareholders more legal rights, shareholders and managers sought a new 
mechanism for electing directors onto the board.14 
A. Background of Shareholder Nominating Practices
Shareholders in all U.S. publicly traded companies currently have the
power to nominate candidates for the board of directors through two
methods: (1) by nominating a candidate to the board committee, who then 
decides whether to include that candidate in the board’s recommended 
slate,  which is sent to the shareholders through the annual proxy statement; 
or (2) by initiating a proxy contest at the expense of the nominating 
shareholder. 
In the U.S., the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) requires
publicly traded corporations to issue proxy materials to all shareholders 
prior to an annual shareholder meeting.15 These proxy materials include
information about shareholder proposals, persons nominated for election 
8. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 996
(2010).
9. Id. at 997. 
10. See id.
 11. Id. at 998. 
12. See Dallas, supra note 5, at 352–53. 
13. See generally id.
14. See id. at 352.
 15. See  REGULATION 14A: SOLICITATION OF PROXIES, EXCHANGE ACT ¶ 240.14a­










   

























    
   
to the board of directors, and any other relevant information on issues 
requiring vote by shareholders.16 Shareholders receive this information 
prior to the meeting to allow sufficient time to access and review all
proposals and nominees in order to make informed votes either at the
meeting or in advance of the meeting through mail or an electronic ballot.17 
Although the exact internal policy may vary from one corporation to
another, nominations of directors are generally submitted to the board, or 
a designated nomination committee of the board, to review and evaluate.18 
The board or the nominating committee typically evaluate all nominated 
candidates19 and request additional information from candidates to assist 
with the evaluation.20 If approved, the nominated candidate is included in
the company’s proxy statement.21 If denied, the nominated candidate is
not included in the company’s proxy statement and will not be available 
for nomination at the meeting.22 
When a shareholder’s candidate is excluded from the company’s proxy 
materials because his or her nomination is denied, a shareholder may choose
to bypass the board process by engaging in a proxy contest.23 A proxy
contest involves a shareholder distributing their own proxy statement, 
detailing the candidate they wish to nominate, at their own significant
expense and without the opportunity for reimbursement.24 The substantial 
expense and degree of difficulty associated with distributing individual 
proxy materials to each shareholder of the corporation deters shareholders 




 19. BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 1. 
20. Id. at 5. 
21. Best Practice Guidelines for the Appointment of Directors, MAURITUS INSTIT.







23.  Gerstein et al., supra note 4.
 24. See Michael Ide, Proxy Fights Cost U.S. Companies $4.8 Million On Average, 
VALUE WALK (Sept. 10, 2014, 12:26 PM), http://www.valuewalk.com/2014/09/proxy-fights­
costs/ [https://perma.cc/XEY6-YHXQ].
25. John C. Coffee & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund 
Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 570 (2016). 
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activist shareholders between $200,000 to $1,000,000 depending on the 
size of the corporation.26 
An alternative mechanism, which is the focus of this Comment, enables
shareholders to directly nominate candidates by including a candidate in
the company’s proxy materials. This mechanism is “proxy access.” Proxy
access changes shareholder-voting procedures by allowing minority
shareholders a voice in nominating directors and thereby becoming more 
influential in the corporation.27 Proxy access has the potential to provide
power to shareholders that otherwise would have no voice. However, this
increase in control raises concerns as to what may happen when shareholders 
with short-term interests, particularly activist investors, obtain increased
control and influence in a corporation.28 
Part I discusses the background of shareholder nominating practices and 
U.S. corporate law. Part II reviews the history of proxy access in the U.S.
by discussing SEC Rule 14a-11. Part III defines the component parts of 
proxy access policies and varying requirements corporations are able to
implement when adopting proxy access. Part IV explores how proxy access
would look in application by reviewing shareholder ownership of the Coca
Cola Company, a corporation that has recently adopted proxy access. Part
V considers the stances of different entities and organizations regarding 
adopting proxy access. Part VI explores recent controversies and the future 
of proxy access in the U.S. Part VII compares shareholder nominating 
proposals in varying countries. Lastly, Part VIII provides a conclusion and
the impact of proxy access in the future. 
B. Background of U.S. Corporate Law
In order to understand the potential impact proxy access may have on 
U.S. corporations, the history of the U.S. corporate form must be considered. 
Shareholder activism in general rose significantly throughout the 20th
century.29 A shift occurred in the 1980s with the rise of institutional
investors.30 Corporate focus shifted from managerial methods that emphasized
 26. Ide, supra note 24. The wide range in cost depends on multiple factors including 
the size of the organization and the number of shareholders. The smaller the company, the 
lower the cost, and the larger the company, the higher the cost.
27. See id.
 28. See id.
29. See Dallas, supra note 5, at 267. 
30. See generally id. Institutional entities, rather than individuals, increasingly own
corporate shares–institutional owners increased ownership from 19% corporate shares in
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firm growth to focusing on appeasing shareholder interests.31 Shareholders 
began shifting away from a corporate form focused on director primacy when 
shareholders started taking control of corporations.32 Activist investors 
began urging managers to engage in short-termism that by focusing on 
increasing stock prices in the short term, rather than increasing the
long-term fundamental value of the corporation.33 Giving increased 
power to shareholders resulted in giving power not only to some, but 
to all shareholders. Institutional investors can be classified into categories 
based on the stability of their ownership and the size of stake they own
in the company.34 These categories include long-term, dedicated, investors
and short-term, transient or quasi-index, investors.35  The importance 
of shareholder primacy came to light in the aftermath of the 2001 Enron 
scandal, which further exemplified the importance of vesting power in
shareholders, rather than giving sole discretion to directors.36 From one
standpoint, Enron illustrated the risks of deregulation through the 
unprecedented rise and fall of the corporation.37 The eventual response
was Enron filing Chapter 11 bankruptcy.38 When the dust settled, nothing 
was left of Enron.39 Many shareholders were left with nothing to show of 
their investments–life savings, 401Ks, and pension funds were all gone.40 
1970, 37% in 1990, and 50% in 2008. Kahan & Rock, supra note 8, at 996. In turn,
corporations are composed of mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, funds 
and endowments, banks, and individual owners. Id. The rise of institutional owners
thereby places an intermediary barrier between the actual owners and the corporation. Id. 
at 997. This added barrier creates greater management accountability, as institutional
investors are more sophisticated. See Christopher Takeshi Napier, Student Note: Resurrecting Rule 
14a-11: A Renewed Call for Federal Proxy Access Reform, Justifications and Suggested
Revisions, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 843, 896 (2015). In turn, increases in institutional ownership
have led to greater day-to-day market trading as short-term investors increasingly acquired 
larger portions of corporations. Id. Short-term investors began dominating corporations 
with their concerns over stock prices, but remained uninterested in finding long-term 
solutions. See Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-
Phased Voting, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 541, 562 (2016). Conflicts thereby arose between the 
management of companies and the shareholder beneficiaries. See id.
 31. See generally Dallas, supra note 5, at 267. 
32. See id. at 267–68. 
33. See Michael K. Molitor, The Crucial Role of the Nominating Committee: 
Re-Inventing Nominating Committees in the Aftermath of Shareholder Access to the Proxy, 
11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 97, 99 (2010). 
34. Dallas, supra note 5, at 303. 
35. Id. at 303–04. 
36. See id.
 37. See William W. Bratton, Does Corporate Law Protect the Interests of Shareholders 
and Other Stakeholders?: Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 
1275, 1299 (2002). 
38. Id.
 39. Id. at 1282. 
40. Id.
442
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Enron did not only affect shareholders, but it also alerted the entire country
to the potential risks of relaxed regulations.41 In response, Congress passed 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in an effort to place greater safeguards. Sarbanes-
Oxley prevents executives from potentially defrauding shareholders.42 
Following the Enron scandal, corporations placed directors under stricter
review, allowing shareholder activism to flourish.43 
The true consequences of shareholder activism became recognizable 
seven years after the Enron scandal in the largest financial crisis the U.S.,
and arguably the world, has seen since the Great Depression.44 The consistent 
short-termism practices visible in the high risk-taking behavior throughout 
Wall Street came to a halt when the housing bubble burst and the financial 
market crashed.45 Unlike in the Enron scandal, shareholders in the 2008 
financial crisis were no longer the victims46 Instead, shareholders, specifically 
institutional investors, were responsible for directing the market’s focus 
to obtaining quick profits in any manner possible.47 Not all shareholders 
were at fault as the problem was not the long-term shareholders, but rather 
the short-term shareholders.48 These shareholders, often referred to as
transient institutional owners, exhibited short-termism interests.49 Short-
term shareholders furthered these interests by seeking out firms with internal 
control weakness, encouraging financial misreporting, and cutting Research 
and Development and other discretionary expenses in order to meet earning
targets.50 In the aftermath of the financial crisis, shareholders were not
held fully accountable for their actions as many institutional owners and
shareholders were also hurt.51 These shareholders shifted the blame claiming 
their misfortune was a result of bad decisions made by the board as a result
of limited director accountability and what seemed to be limited shareholder 
rights.52 Again, Congress acted, but this time responded by permitting the
 41. Id. at 1277. 
42. Michael A. Perino, Symposium: Enron and Ots Aftermath: Enron’s Legislative 
Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 671–72 (2002). 
43. See id. 
44. Dallas, supra note 5, at 267. 
45. Id.
 46. See id. at 316. 
47. Id.
48.  Dallas & Barry, supra note 30, at 563. 
49. See id.
50. Coffee & Palia, supra note 25, at 573. 
51. See Dallas, supra note 5, at 316–20. 
52. See id. 
 443








   
 














    
   
 





SEC to provide greater shareholder voting power on issues related to the
board.53 
No federal regulation currently mandates public companies to provide 
shareholders with proxy access. The SEC attempted to promulgate a proxy 
access policy for all public companies in SEC Rule 14a-11. However, the
rule was abandoned after the District of Columbia Circuit Court ruled it
invalid. Today, the only government regulation regarding proxy access is
through state action by North Dakota and Delaware.54 Each state has enacted 
laws that permit companies to adopt proxy access provisions to their 
bylaws. 
II. HISTORY OF PROXY ACCESS
A. The Debate Over Proxy Access
In recent years, U.S. publicly traded companies have increasingly began 
adopting proxy access policies.55 Accordingly, a visible increase in similar 
corporate governance policies also is prevalent internationally as many
countries have begun adopting policies that provide minority shareholders 
greater input into the direct nomination and selection process of board 
members.56 
B. SEC Rule 14a-11
In the U.S., the financial crisis of 2008 led to requests for significant
changes to corporate governance regulations.57 In response, the U.S. 
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which amended sections of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.58 The Dodd-Frank Act permitted the
SEC to establish rules requiring publicly traded companies to allow 
shareholders proxy access.59 The Act also allowed the SEC the discretion 
53. See id. at 352. 
54. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-08; DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 112. 
55. See James R. Copland & Margaret M. O’Keefe, 2016 Finding 1, PROXY MONITOR, 
http://www.proxymonitor.org/Forms/2016Finding1.aspx  [https:// perma.cc/2A4M-CHSM]
(last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
56. Shareholder Involvement in the Director Nomination Process: Enhanced Engagement 
and Proxy Access, CAN. COAL. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE (2015), http://www.ccgg.ca/site/
ccgg/assets/pdf/proxy_access_finalv.35.docx_630.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XDK-QTVV].
57. See Scott L. Landau et al., Dodd-Frank Act Reforms Executive Compensation 




 59. Id. at 4. 
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to exempt certain companies from proxy access requirements.60 In its
2010 Final Rule: Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, the SEC 
focused on countering the lack of transparency in the voting process, the 
level of communication between shareholders and directors, and the 
relationship between shareholder interest and the company’s economic 
interests.61 The SEC enabled proxy access for shareholders to nominate 
up to 25% of the board through a company’s proxy statement so long as 
the shareholder owned at least 3% of the company’s outstanding shares
for a three-year period and ensure they are not attempting a hostile takeover 
of the company.62 
In 2011, Rule 14a-11 was challenged in court decision between the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable.63 The U.S. Court of
Appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit invalidated the SEC’s regulations.64 
The Court stated that the SEC failed to adequately analyze the costs and 
benefits associated with implementing the regulation.65 Following the
Court’s decision, the SEC has not implemented any similar proxy access 
regulations or conducted a cost-benefit analysis noted in the opinion by
the court.66 Instead, the SEC has allowed corporations to self-determine 
their own proxy access policies to adopt.67 Thus, corporations have regained 
power to individually determine whether or not to permit proxy access in
voting procedures.68 
III. CONSTRUCTING PROXY ACCESS BYLAWS
In general, proxy access allows shareholders the ability to significantly 
influence the nomination process of board members.69 Shareholder power, 
over the board of directors, derives from either direct influence over the 
nomination process or through influence over nominees.70 When granted 
60. See id.
 61. Id.
 62. CAN. COAL. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE, supra note 56. Id.
63.  Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1149 (2011). 
64. Id. at 1147, 1148–49, 1150, 1156. 
65. Id. at 1148–49. 
66. See Copland & O’Keefe, supra note 55. 
67. See id.
 68. See CAN. COAL. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE, supra note 56. 
69. Id. 
70. Proxy Access, COUNSEL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, http://www.cii.org/proxy_ 
access [https://perma.cc/Z7WY-MEL8] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
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proxy access, minority shareholders who meet certain threshold requirements 
may place their own nominees in the company’s proxy statement and proxy
voting ballot.71 This placement is at no cost to the shareholder, saving the
shareholders from distributing their own proxy information, which can be 
an expensive and complicated process.72 Additionally, this policy also 
allows shareholders to bypass board approval when nominating candidates.73 
Companies may choose to sua sponte adopt policies enabling shareholder 
proxy access; however, common practice indicates most companies adopt 
policies only after shareholders request or propose adopting the procedure.74 
In recent years, the trend has changed. Publicly traded companies have
increasingly started to adopt proxy access bylaws; some even voluntarily 
adopted proxy access prior to receiving shareholder proposals.75 The 
rationale behind this adoption falls into two categories: (1) either the
adopting company wishes to be proactive and promote shareholder rights, 
or (2) the adoption is merely seeking to get ahead of the debate and adopt
policies that fit the company’s best interests.76 The Coca-Cola Company 
is an example of one of the recent companies that adopted proxy access 
without a shareholder proposal on the issue.77 Following the September
2015 proxy access bylaw adoption, Coca-Cola’s 2016 Proxy Statement
stated, “The Board adopted the proxy access bylaw following several months 
of thoughtful discussions with shareowners. We learned there was broad 
agreement among our shareowners about the desire for proxy access and that 
many of our shareowners consider proxy access to be a fundamental right.”78 
Not all companies adopt proxy access bylaws or even support shareholder 
proposals for proxy access;79 some companies remain opposed to proxy
access.80 For example, the Starbucks Coffee Company openly opposed a
recent shareholder proposal regarding proxy access in its 2016 Proxy 
Statement.81 The Starbucks Board recommended that shareholders vote
71. Andrew Bor et al., Proxy Access Update—Preparing for the 2016 Proxy Season, 
JD SURPA BUSINESS ADVISOR (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/proxy­
access-update-preparing-for-the-92187/ [https://perma.cc/JAQ8-G9TH]. 
72. Id.
 73. See id.
 74. Id. 




 77. See COCA-COLA CO., 2016 PROXY STATEMENT 2 (2016).
78. Id.
 79. See generally STARBUCKS COFFEE CO., NOTICE OF 2015 MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS
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against the proposal, asserting that the proposed proxy access bylaw was 
not beneficial to the company.82 The proposal would have allowed an
unlimited number of shareholders to aggregate together to meet the 3%
ownership threshold requirement for three years.83 The Board merely stated
that the inconsistent support of proxy access and particularities of procedures
among Starbucks shareholders led to the Board’s recommendation against 
voting for the recent proposal, without further elaboration or explanation.84 
The Board also noted that Starbucks’s robust shareholder outreach program
continues to provide a sufficient voice to shareholders, so proxy access was 
not necessary.85 Therefore, until a proposal is made in the best interest of
shareholders and the company, the Board asserts that it believes it is
unnecessary to adopt a proposal prematurely.86 
A. Proxy Access Provisions in General
For a shareholder to engage in proxy access, the shareholder must meet
the requirements set forth in the company’s adopted proxy access policy.87 
These requirements vary but may include meeting an ownership threshold 
or an ownership holding period.88 Additionally, proxy access policies 
typically limit the total percentage or maximum number of board members 
that shareholders may elect through proxy access nominations.89 Moreover,
proxy access policies generally permit shareholders to aggregate together
to meet the threshold requirements.90 Furthermore, many proxy access 
policies restrict renomination of candidates nominated through proxy access
procedures who fail to be elected to the board.91
 82. Id.
83. Id. at 53. 
84. Id. at 54. 
85. Id.
 86. Id.
 87. See SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, Key Takeaways: Proxy
Access–Latest Developments, JD SURPA (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.jdsupra.com/legal 
news/key-takeaways-proxy-access-latest-69510/ [http://perma.cc/8F8F-NARZ]. 
88. See id.
 89. See id.
 90. See id.
91.  Bor et al., supra note 71. 
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B. Ownership Threshold
An ownership threshold requires shareholders to own a certain percentage 
of shares to qualify to participate in proxy access voting.92 This percentage 
threshold varies depending on the individual corporation’s bylaws, but 
typically, require either a 3%, 5%, or 20% holding of the company’s current
outstanding shares.93 In the 2015 proxy season, a 3% threshold was the most 
common requirement for shareholder proposals.94 While thresholds higher
than 3% occur, they are less common because they are criticized as troublesome
for corporations since few shareholders meet the heightened thresholds.95 
C. Aggregation of Shareholders
In an effort to meet the ownership threshold requirements, under most 
proxy policies, shareholders may aggregate together.96 Some company bylaw
provisions limit the number of shareholders that can form a nominating
group.97 Most often, the limit on the number of shareholders that may aggregate 
together is capped at twenty shareholders.98 In turn, corporate boards and 
shareholder groups conflict over group aggregation rules.99 Shareholders 
prefer no restrictions, whereas boards generally prefer to limit aggregation
numbers.100 This dispute is centered around the idea that the higher the
aggregation ceiling, the more likely shareholders who may otherwise not 
have been able to engage in proxy access are able to do so.101 
D. Ownership Holding Period
In addition to an ownership threshold, a corporation’s bylaw provisions
may require a nominating shareholder to own a certain amount of shares 
for a certain period of time to qualify to participate in nominating through
proxy access.102 Some corporations may require one, two, or three years
 92. See Key Provisions of Proxy Access Mechanisms–Covington & Burling, 
COUNSEL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/
board_accountability/Proxy%20Access/Proxy%20Access%20Regimes%204%201%201
6.xls [http://perma.cc/T65W-GA7U] (last updated Apr. 7, 2016). 
93. See id.
94.  Bor et al., supra note 71. 
95. Id.
 96. See SKADDEN, supra note 87. 
97. See id.
 98. See id.
 99. Id.
 100. See id.
 101. Id.
 102. See Key Provisions of Proxy Access Mechanisms–Covington & Burling, supra
note 92. 
448
VUKOVICH (DO NOT DELETE) 6/11/2018 2:03 PM     
 
































[VOL. 19:  437, 2018] Proxy Access Voting 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
of ownership; others may not require an ownership period at all.103 Overall, the
most common ownership period is three years.104 This is evidenced by the
fact that all shareholder proposals during the 2015 proxy season had a 
three-year holding period requirement.105 
E. Caps on Number of Nominees
Statutes and company bylaws commonly place caps on the total number 
or percentage of the board that shareholders may elect through proxy
access.106 Generally, these limits exist as 20%, 25%, or 33%,107 with 20%
being the most common nominee cap.108 In most publicly traded companies,
this percentage usually translates to shareholders having two proxy access 
nominees.109 As such, a growing trend is for corporations to allow shareholders
to nominate up to 20% of the board, or at most two proxy access nominees.110 
The purpose of placing caps on the number of shareholder nominees is to
avoid shareholders gaining control of the company through their nominees in
successive years and subsequent elections.111 
F. Renomination Restrictions
Finally, the majority of corporate bylaws enabling proxy access state
that if a candidate is nominated through proxy access procedures and does 
not receive at least 25% of the total votes cast, the nominee is precluded 
from renomination for a set period of time.112 The period of time varies,
but is typically two years; however, some organizations, such as the Council 
of Institutional Investors, advocate against any restrictions on renomination.113
 103. Id.
104. See SKADDEN, supra note 87. 
105. Id. A proxy season is the time period that companies released proxy materials 
during 2015. See id.











 Bor et al., supra note 71. 
Id.
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IV. AN EXAMPLE OF PROXY ACCESS IN APPLICATION
To illustrate proxy access in application, this section reviews the Coca-
Cola Company’s recently adopted proxy access bylaw provisions. In
2015, Coca-Cola adopted a proxy access bylaw provision that permits: 
[A] shareowner, or a group of up to 20 shareowners, owning 3% or more of the 
Company’s outstanding Common Stock continuously for at least three years to
nominate and include in the Company’s proxy materials director nominees
constituting up to two individuals or 20% of the Board (whichever is greater).114 
In 2017, Coca-Cola had 4.3 billion outstanding common stock shares.115 
Therefore, any shareholder with less than 120,000,000 shares could not 
unilaterally gain proxy access because of the 3% threshold.116 
Coca-Cola’s financial records reveal that institutional investors own 
significantly more shares than any insiders.117 Thus, insiders likely will not 
individually qualify for proxy access voting as their overall share percentages 
are far below the threshold requirements of proxy access. In this context,
insiders within Coca-Cola own between 550,075 shares and 89,709 shares.118 
The number of shares owned by even the highest insider is substantially
below many institutional holders.119 The current CEO of Coca-Cola, Kent 
Ahmet Muhtar, owns 550,075 shares of the company, which is more shares
than any other insider, yet, still substantially less than any of the top
institutional investors.120 
In contrast, institutional investors and mutual funds own 63.2% of
Coca-Cola.121 The following chart illustrates the ownership amount of the
top institutional investors of Coca Cola and their ownership translated into 
ownership percentage of the company:
 114. COCA-COLA CO., 2016 PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 77, at 101. 
115. Coca-Cola Company (The) Stock Report, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/ symbol/ 
ko/stock-report [http://perma.cc/35QG-EGZN] (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). The figures utilized 
in this Comment reflect ownership of the Coca-Cola Company as of February 2017. Although 
the figures have changed since then, they remain useful to illustrate the application of 
proxy access policies to a distribution of shareholder ownership within a company that has 
enacted such policies. Any changes in the figures have not altered the illustration.
116. See id.
 117. The Coca-Cola Company (KO): Major Holders, YAHOO FINANCE, https://finance.yahoo. 
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Institutional Investors Number of Shares Ownership
Percentage
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. 399,910,000122 9.27%123 
Capital World Investors 131,556,918124 3.05%125 
BlackRock Institutional  
Trust Company 
84,654,789 126 1.96%127 
Capital Research Global Investors 65,716,545128 1.52%129 
BlackRock Fund Advisors 63,170,942130 1.46%131 
State Street Corporation 21,389,192132 0.49%133 
122. See Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Annual Report (Information Table of Form 13F­
HR) (Feb. 14, 2017). 
123. This percentage was calculated by comparing the number of shares Berkshire 
Hathaway reported ownership with sole voting power over and the current number of
outstanding Coca-Cola shares. See generally id.; Coca-Cola Company (The) Stock Report, 
supra note 115. 
124. See Capital World Investors, Annual Report (Information Table of Form 13F-HR)
(Feb. 15, 2017). 
125. This percentage was calculated by comparing the number of shares Capital
World Investors reported ownership with sole voting power over and the current number
of outstanding Coca-Cola shares. See generally id.; Coca-Cola Company (The) Stock Report, 
supra note 115. 
126. See BlackRock Institutional Trust Company N A, Annual Report (Information
Table of Form 13F-HR) (Feb. 10, 2017). 
127.  This percentage was calculated by comparing the number of shares BlackRock
Institutional Trust Company reported ownership with sole voting power over and the
current number of outstanding Coca-Cola shares. See generally id.; Coca-Cola Company 
(The) Stock Report, supra note 115. 
128. See Capital Research Global Investors, Annual Report (Information Table of
Form 13F-HR) (Feb. 15, 2017). 
129. This percentage was calculated by comparing the number of shares Capital 
Research Global Investors reported ownership with sole voting power over and the current 
number of outstanding Coca-Cola shares. See generally id.; Coca-Cola Company (The)
Stock Report, supra note 115. 
130. See BlackRock Fund Advisors, Annual Report (Information Table of Form 13F­
HR) (Feb. 10, 2017). 
131.  This percentage was calculated by comparing the number of shares BlackRock
Fund Advisors reported ownership with sole voting power over and the current number of
outstanding Coca-Cola shares. See generally id.; Coca-Cola Company (The) Stock Report, 
supra note 115. 
132. See State Street Corp., Annual Report (Information Table of Form 13F-HR) (Feb. 
9, 2017). 
133. This percentage was calculated by comparing the number of shares State Street 
Corporation reported ownership with sole voting power over and the current number of 
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Bank of America Corporation 12,530,563134 0.29%135 
FMR, LLC 8,653,401136 0.2%137 
Vanguard Group, Inc. 6,152,146138 0.14%139 
In accordance with the above institutional investor statistics, only Berkshire 
Hathaway, Inc. and Capital World Investors would unilaterally meet the 
ownership threshold requirements.140 
Coca-Cola bylaws permit up to twenty shareholders to aggregate together 
to meet the requirement.141 Thus, under the current Coca-Cola policy,
although only the top two institutional investors individually meet the 
ownership threshold, the remaining top institutional investors may join 
together with other shareholders to meet the threshold requirement.142 
Finally, Coca-Cola’s bylaws set forth a three-year ownership requirement 
in order for shareholders to qualify for proxy access.143 Unfortunately, 
however, publicly available statistics do not indicate ownership longevity
so it is unclear how many of Coca-Cola’s top institutional investors are 
actually eligible to utilize proxy access.144 
outstanding Coca-Cola shares. See generally id.; Coca-Cola Company (The) Stock Report, 
supra note 115. 
134. See Bank of America Corp DE, Annual Report (Information Table of Form
13F-HR) (Feb. 14, 2017). 
135. This percentage was calculated by comparing the number of shares Bank of
America Corporation reported ownership with sole voting power over and the current
number of outstanding Coca-Cola shares. See generally id.; Coca-Cola Company (The) 
Stock Report, supra note 115. 
136. See FMR LLC, Annual Report (Information Table of Form 13F-HR) (Feb. 10, 
2017).
137. This percentage was calculated by comparing the number of shares FMR, LLC 
reported ownership with sole voting power over and the current number of outstanding 
Coca-Cola shares. See generally id.; Coca-Cola Company (The) Stock Report, supra note 
115. 
138. See Vanguard Group Inc., Annual Report (Information Table of Form 13F-HR)
(Feb. 14, 2017). 
139. This percentage was calculated by comparing the number of shares Vanguard
Group Inc. reported ownership with sole voting power over and the current number of 
outstanding Coca-Cola shares. See generally id.; Coca-Cola Company (The) Stock Report, 
supra note 115. 
140. See supra notes 126–35 and accompanying text; see COCA-COLA CO., 2016 PROXY
STATEMENT, supra note 77, at 101. 
141. COCA-COLA CO., 2016 PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 77, at 101. 
142. See The Coca-Cola Company (KO): Major Holders, supra note 117. This also 
assumes, however, that the shareholder also meets the holding period requirement. See 
discussion supra III.B.
 143. COCA-COLA CO., 2016 PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 77, at 101. 
144. See, e.g., The Coca-Cola Company (KO): Major Holders, supra note 117.
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V. PROXY ACCESS PROPOSALS GAIN SUPPORT
A. States Entering the Fray
Following the Court of Appeal’s decision overturning the SEC’s Rule 
14a-11, several states including North Dakota and Delaware enacted proxy
access statutes to fill in the gap in the absence of additional federal 
regulations.145 
1. North Dakota
North Dakota Century Code Section 10-35, enacted in 2007, gives
shareholders greater power to elect individuals to the board of directors in 
publicly traded corporations.146 All new corporations within the state are
subject to the requirements of the law and all corporations incorporated
before the 2007 enactment may elect to incorporate into their bylaws or 
articles that the corporation is thereby subject to the statute.147 Additionally,
the statute holds that the corporation may not change the size of the board 
when either (1) there is notice that a contested election of board members
is going to occur, or (2) when shareholders cannot nominate board members 
at the next regular shareholder meeting.148 
The purpose of the statute is to allow shareholders, who own at least 5%
of the corporation‘s outstanding shares, the ability to nominate directors
through the corporation’s proxy statements.149 As stated by the North Dakota
Corporate Governance Council during codification, the statute “provides 
a governance structure for publicly traded corporations that gives shareholders 
greater rights than they currently have under other state laws. It has been
designed to reflect the best thinking of institutional investors and governance
experts and addresses each of the current hot topics in corporate governance.”150 
After a shareholder provides notice of their intent to nominate an individual 
through the corporation’s proxy materials, a company must include the name
 145. See Copland & O’Keefe, supra note 55. 
146. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-06.
147. Larry Ribstein, The North Dakota Experiment, HARVARD L. SCH. FORUM ON
CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Apr. 23, 2007), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2007/04/23/the­
north-dakota-experiment/ [http://perma.cc/NAG5-C56S].
148. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-06(3).
149. See id. § 10-35-08. 
150. Ribstein, supra note 147. 
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of the nominee and a statement no longer than five-hundred words in 
support of each nominee in the corporation’s proxy statement.151 
The statute also requires corporations include a provision that requires 
each shareholder to vote on each nominee listed on the proxy statement.152 
Furthermore, the corporation may not require the nominating shareholder 
to include in the notice more than their name, a statement assuring they satisfy 
the shareholder requirements, a statement that the nominator is not violating
any state or federal laws by making the nomination, the information required
for inclusion in the proxy statement, and consent from the nominee to be
nominated.153 
2. Delaware 
In contrast to North Dakota law, which allows proxy access in publicly
traded corporations, Delaware law merely permits corporations to adopt 
proxy access provisions in the corporation’s bylaws.154 Delaware General 
Corporation Law (“DGCL”) Section 112, enacted in 2009, states that a 
corporation may allow shareholders access to nominating directors through 
including the nominees in the company’s proxy materials.155 A corporation 
choosing to enable shareholder proxy access may allow shareholders the 
ability to include nominations of one or more individuals on the company’s
proxy statement to appear alongside nominations made by the board.156 
Additionally, a corporation’s bylaws may provide other requirements. 
First, a corporation may require shareholders wishing to vote through proxy
access to meet a minimum share ownership requirement for a specified
period of time.157 Second, a corporation may also require the nominating
shareholder to submit information regarding their ownership and their
nominee.158 Third, a corporation may require a provision to condition
eligibility of a shareholder to nominate on a comparison of the total number 
of nominees nominated by shareholders with the total number of nominees 
nominated by the board.159 Additionally, whether the shareholder previously
nominated through the company’s proxy materials may be taken into
 151. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-08(1)(a). 
152. Id. § 10-35-08(1)(b). 
153. Id.  § 10-35-08(2). 
154. C. Kent Carlson et al., New Provision of Delaware Corporate Law Addresses 
Bylaw for Proxy Access, K&L GATES LLP (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.klgates.com/new­
provision-of-delaware-corporate-law-addresses-bylaw-for-proxy-access-04-24-2009/ 
[http://perma.cc/BDP3-KPV6]. 
155. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at § 112(1). 
158. Id. at § 112(2). 
159. Id. at § 112(3). 
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account.160 Fourth, a corporation may permissibly provide a provision that
excludes a shareholder from nominating individuals when the shareholder
previously acquired or publicly proposed acquiring a percentage of the 
company in order to take control of the company.161 Fifth, a provision
requiring the shareholder to indemnify the corporation for any loss that result
from false or misleading statements in their nomination is authorized.162 
Lastly, sixth, the statute permits a corporation to include any lawful provisions
or conditions to limit shareholder access to proxy materials.163 
B. Increases in Private Ordering
Following the enactment of 14a-11, and as mentioned earlier, the Court 
of Appeal overturned the rule finding the SEC was “arbitrary and capricious” 
in creating the rule.164 Although the Court of Appeal’s decision overturned
rule 14a-11, the decision left the SEC amendments to rule 14a-8 intact,
which authorizes shareholders to submit proposals to permit proxy access 
procedures.165 This resulted in the private ordering of proxy access through 
shareholder proposals.166 During the 2015 proxy access season, over one
hundred shareholder proxy access proposals contained the exact language 
of the SEC’s vacated rule 14a-11.167 Current statistics by the Institution of
Shareholder Services reveal that of the Standard & Poor’s 500 (“S&P 500”)
companies,168 over 50% had adopted proxy access bylaws.169
 160. Id. 
161. Id. at § 112(4). 
162. Id. at § 112(5). 
163. Id. at § 112(6). 
164. Avrohom J. Kess et al., Proxy Access Proposals, HARV. L. SCH. F.  ON CORP.




167.  Bor et al., supra note 71. 
168. S&P 500 companies are 500 large publicly traded companies that list stock on
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the Nasdaq Stock Market (NASDAQ). See
Standard & Poor’s 500 Index—S&P 500, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/s/sp500.asp [http://perma.cc/NSY5-P7SN] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
169. Proxy Access Reaches the Tipping Point: Adopted by Just Over 50% (251) of
S&P 500 Companies as of December 31, 2016, SIDLEY 1 (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www. 
sidley.com/~/media/update-pdfs/2016/12/proxy-access-corporate-governance-report­
december-2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/6WQK-VAR7]. It is important to note that this statistic
includes the percentage of all adopted proxy access policies. Therefore, the statistic is not 
limited just to companies that have adopted proxy access through shareholder proposals. 
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Based on the influx of shareholder proposals, many company boards 
requested no-action letters from the SEC in an effort to obtain an opinion 
on whether the proxy access proposals put forth by the shareholders or by 
management should be voted on.170 The SEC responded in 2015 with
establishing a no-action rule, declining to offer opinions on competing proxy 
access proposals. In turn, shareholders can vote on the two proposals, the 
shareholder proposed proposal and the board proposed proposal.171 
C. New York Comptroller Boardroom Initiative
In 2015, New York Comptroller, Scott M. Stinger, first launched the 
Boardroom Accountability Project.172 The purpose of the project was to 
break through proxy access barriers by obtaining greater access for
shareholders while still holding board members accountable.173 The project 
incentivized targeted companies to adopt proxy access procedures.174 The
companies targeted were selected based on three categories: “carbon­
intensive coal, oil & gas and utility companies; companies with little or 
no board diversity, including gender diversity; and companies that received 
strong opposition to their non-binding say-on-pay votes in 2014.”175 In 
turn, the New York City Pension Funds, which are under the direction of 
the comptroller, filed 75 shareholder resolutions requesting companies
adopt proxy access bylaws allowing shareholders with 3% ownership for
three years to nominate directors through a company’s proxy materials.176 
Two thirds of the requests received majority support when taken to vote
and 37 of the companies soon after agreed to implement appropriate proxy
access bylaws.177 
Instead, the statistic includes companies that choose to amend the bylaws and adopt proxy
access policies prior to receiving a proxy access proposal or a vote regarding proxy access
occurring.
170. Human, supra note 75. An SEC no-action letter is a letter written by the SEC 
indicating the SEC staff will not take action against a corporation if it chooses to engage 
in the course of action it sought guidance on. 
171. Human, supra note 75. 
172. Press Release, Office of the New York City Comptroller, Comptroller Stringer, 
New York City Funds, Announce Expansion of Boardroom Accountability Project (Jan. 
11, 2016), http://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptroller-stringer-new-york-city-funds­
announce-expansion-of-boardroom-accountability-project/ [https://perma.cc/JC7D-2ZSS].






Human, supra note 75. 
 Press Release, Office of the New York City Comptroller, supra note 172. 
Id. At the time this Comment was written, 109 companies have either enacted proxy
launch. Id.
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D. Investment Funds
Several investment funds have begun leading efforts to increase shareholder 
rights through more protective proxy policies.178 
The Council of Institutional Investors (“CII”) is composed of corporate 
public and employee benefit funds and endowments.179 The association is
“a leading voice for effective corporate governance, strong shareowner 
rights and vibrant, transparent and fair capital markets.”180 Seven proxy
access provisions, disclosed by the CII, negatively limited shareholder
access.181 These provisions included: 
An ownership requirement of 5% . . . .; . . . less than two proxy access candidates; 
Any limits on aggregation for a shareholder nominating group; The exclusion of
loaned shares; Requirements that the nominating shareholder hold the shares after
the annual meeting; Restrictions on renominations of proxy access nominees who 
fail to receive a specific minimum percentage of votes; Prohibitions on third-
party compensation of access nominees.182 
Many of these provisions reoccur in most current proposals. The major balance 
between shareholder rights and the board retaining control is implicated.
Essentially, these seamless provisions enable shareholders power without 
giving them unlimited restraint; yet, institutions such as the CII believe
these provisions are too restrictive and do not provide shareholders with
the resources they should have through proxy access.183 
Similarly, the Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) influences
shareholder voting by making recommendations to institutional investors
on shareholder power.184 In 2015, the ISS recommended a shareholder
proposal that allowed proxy access to nominate up to 25% of the board to 
shareholders who own 3% of the company’s outstanding shares for three 
or more years.185 This recommendation did not restrict the aggregate number
 178. See generally About Us, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV., http://www.cii.org/ 
about_us [https://perma.cc/93MZ-3CGT] (last visited Feb. 16, 2018). 





 Bor et al., supra note 71. 
Id. 
183. See id.
184. James R. Copland et al., A Report on Corporate Governance and Shareholder 
[https://perma.cc/C7SN-8GM2]. 
185.  Bor et al., supra note 71. 
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of shareholders forming a nominating group.186 ISS also recommended 
companies reasonably review all shareholder proxy access proposals.187 
Furthermore, the ISS called for “recommendations against directors of a
company that unilaterally omits a shareholder proposal unless the company
has taken steps to implement proxy access on terms consistent with the
shareholder proposal.”188 In accordance with the CII, the ISS also provides
stringent standards to maximize shareholder power without providing a 
compromising alternative.189 
In contrast to the above mentioned investment funds, Glass Lewis, an 
institutional investor, introduced the Glass Lewis proxy access policies
that reveal an alternate approach to reviewing proxy proposals.190 Glass 
Lewis reviewed proposals and director responses on a case-by-case basis.191 
Glass Lewis considered factors such as: “Company size; Board independence;
Diversity of skills; Experience, background and tenure; Shareholder proponent
and rationale for the proposal; Proposal’s ownership and holding period 
thresholds (although the policy does not specify a preferred percentage).”192 
This request is the most well founded as it provides an opportunity to
evaluate policy options in accordance with the costs and benefits to a specific 
corporation.
On its face, proxy access appears to give a necessary voice to minority 
shareholders. Ideally, the threshold ownership and holding period requirements 
enable only long-term shareholders with a significant stake in the corporation 
to engage in proxy access voting.193 Unfortunately, the recommendations
by the ISS and CII show us that this is not the case. The opportunity to
aggregate potentially runs the risk of allowing shareholders with short-term
interests, who merely hold shares in their portfolios for the given period,
to pool together and meet the percentage requirements.194 Pooling 
together enables the short-term shareholders to obtain a significant 
voice in the company.195 Thus, investment funds illustrate that one of the
most significant considerations of proxy access revolves around which 










 193. See id. at 353. 
194. 
195. 
See generally id. at 303–04. 
See generally id.
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E. Institutional Investors
Institutional investors are classified based on the stability of their
ownership, such as longevity of ownership, and the size of stake they own 
in the company.196 In turn, certain classes of institutional investors are
unable to engage in proxy access voting because they do not meet both the
ownership threshold amount and the holding period requirements.197 In 
general, dedicated institutions are more likely than transient and quasi-
indexer institutions to qualify to participate in proxy access voting
because of the length of their holding and the amount they hold; however,
dedicated institutions make up the lowest amount of all institutional 
shareholders.198 Therefore, it is likely that proposed changes by dedicated 
investors would likely benefit the corporation as dedicated investors act 
in the corporation’s best interests.199 An issue arises when other investors,
such as transient institutions and possibly quasi-indexer institutions,
may meet proxy access requirements.200 In most instances, quasi-indexer
institutions likely would not meet the ownership threshold, even though 
196. Dallas, supra note 5, at 303. 
197. Id. at 303–04. As defined by Professor Bushee, three classes of institutional
investors exist: transient investors, quasi-indexer investors, and dedicated investors. Brian
J. Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, 
73 ACCT. REV. 305, 310 (1998). “To account for the possibility that there can be
substantive differences in trading and governance behavior within types of institutions, I 
classify institutional investors into groups using the specific characteristics of institutional 
investor behavior that have been argued to increase the pressure on managers to manipulate
earnings. This approach classifies institutions into three groups-transient, dedicated and
quasi-indexer-based on their past investment patterns in the areas of port- folio turnover, 
diversification, and trading momentum.” Id. “This classification method does not proxy
for classifications based on type, investment styles, or institutional size. Institutions in the 
transient, quasi-indexer and dedicated groups all exhibit significant heterogeneity across 
these other possible classification scheme.” Id. at n.5. 
198. See Dallas, supra note 5, at 304. Transient institutional investors are investors 
that only hold 25% of their portfolio for over two years, while they turn over roughly 70% 
of their portfolio every quarter as a result of aggressive trading strategies. Id. at 303–04. 
Quasi-indexer institutional investors have high diversification in their portfolios as they
own small stakes in many companies, but they trade infrequently. Id. at 304. Dedicated 
institutional investors have substantial investments in a smaller amount of companies and
they hold about 75% of stock for two years and have low quarterly turnovers. Id. During
the years 1983 to 2002, dedicated institutions comprised only 8% of all institutional investors;
transient institutions comprised 31% of institutions; and quasi-indexer institutions comprised 
61% of institutions. Id. 
199. See Dallas & Barry, supra note 30, at 564. 
200. Dallas, supra note 5, at 304. 
 459









































they would likely meet the holding period.201 However, it is far more likely 
for transient institutions to meet proxy access requirements through the
25% of shares they retain for more than two years.202 Transient institutions 
may not meet the requirements on their own.203 Instead, it is more likely
that they will be able to aggregate their shares with other transient institutions
to meet the threshold requirements.204 Coupled with the fact that transient
institutions make up a significant portion of all institutional shareholders,
the potential impact of these institutions using proxy access increases.205 
In the 2015 proxy access season, 61% of institutional investors favored 
proxy access proposals.206 Some of the major institutional investors include
Vanguard, BlackRock, Fidelity State Street Global Advisors, California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”), California State
Teachers’ Retirement System (“CalSTRS”), and T. Rowe Price.207 
Vanguard and BlackRock typically review proposals on a case-by-case 
basis. Each only slightly differs in their position. Vanguard supports proxy 
access for shareholders owning 5% of outstanding shares for three years
to nominate 20% of the board.208 BlackRock generally approves proposals
so long as they do not allow short-term investors to abuse the procedure.209 
This means that BlackRock supports proposals for shareholders owning 3% 
of outstanding shares for three years to nominate 20% of the board.210 
Conversely, Fidelity generally opposes proxy access proposals by
shareholders and management.211 
State Street Global Advisors considers additional factors outside the 
general proxy access items. The additional factors include the performance
of the company, the company’s governance structure, the rights of
shareholders, and the performance of the board.212 However, in the end, 
State Street Global Advisors adopted a bylaw common among organizations; 
the bylaw allows up to twenty shareholders to create a nominating group 
and set threshold ownership at 3% for a holding period of three years to
nominate 20% of the board.213
 201. See id.
 202. See id.
 203. See id.
 204. See id.
 205. See id.
206. 
207. 
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CalPERS has already supported proxy access proposals at 100 of its 
companies; usually supporting proposals for access to shareholders with
3% ownership for three years.214 
CalSTRS supports investors owning 3% of the voting stock for three 
years to nominate a minority of the board.215 
T. Rowe Price also supports proposals for 3% ownership for a two or 
three year holding period and does not prohibit aggregate nomination
groups.216 
VI. RECENT CONTROVERSIES AND THE FUTURE OF PROXY ACCESS
Provided this information, it may appear that proxy access proposals 
are an acceptable practice in the corporate world. However, this is not the 
case. Instead, although some shareholders have succeeded in obtaining 
these policies, the policies have not been utilized. 
A. First Shareholder Use of Proxy Access
As previously stated, over 50% of the S&P 500 companies have 
adopted proxy access bylaws; yet no one is using it.217 This raises the
question of whether the policies are too new or if there are other issues
associated to the recently adopted policies that have not been addressed.218 
In November, 2016, GMACO Investors, shareholders of Natural Fuel and 
Gas (“NFG”), filed a schedule 13D, thereby implementing the first use of 
proxy access in the U.S., and nominated an individual to the board.219 
Unfortunately, NFG rejected the nomination claiming that GMACO 
Investors did not have the right intent to enable them to utilize proxy
access as they violated the take-over policies.220 In response, GMACO 
Investors withdrew their nomination thereby concluding the first attempt 
at implementing proxy access.221 In turn, it is currently unclear what




 217. Proxy Access Reaches the Tipping Point, supra note 169. 
218. See generally id. at 3. 
219. Id. A Schedule 13D is an SEC filing that shareholder of a publicly traded company
































successful; there are no federal procedures or policies currently in 
place.222 
B. SEC Universal Proxy Ballot Proposal
Although the SEC has not proposed a universal proxy access policy
following the revoked rule 14a-11, the SEC has since proposed a universal 
proxy ballot. The universal ballot combats confusion arising from nominees 
presented in separate annual proxy materials. Therefore, in accordance 
with the universal ballot proposal, a shareholder nominee and the management 
nominee would be represented on the same proxy ballot. This 243-page 
proposal is most similar to the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance 
Proposal.223 The SEC proposal seeks to increase the frequency of shareholders
using proxy access policies to nominate candidates to the board.224 The
deadline to make comments to the proposal was on January 9, 2017.225 
C. Anticipated Issues From the New Administration
The SEC universal ballot proposal has met opposition from Republicans. 
The sole Republican SEC commissioner Michael Piwowar voted against
the proposal commenting that the proposal “has been pushed for years by 
special interest groups and it would increase the likelihood of proxy fights 
at public companies, thereby distracting management and employees from 
carrying out their core mission.”226 Therefore, as Chairman Mary Jo White
planned to step down during the new Trump administration, Trump was 
expected to likely fill her vacancy with a Republican commissioners, which 
he did.227 A new commissioner who shares Piwowar’s view on the matter 
can help eliminate the possibility of a universal proxy ballot.228  However, 
at this time, the SEC has yet to approve the proposal.229
 222. See id.
 223. See Steve Wolosky et al., ‘Universal’ proxy proposal: The view from Olshan, 
IR MAGAZINE (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.irmagazine.com/articles/sustainability/21803/
universal-proxy-proposal-view-olshan [https://perma.cc/43FJ-2JUB]. For more information,
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Proxy access is still very new to many U.S. corporations; therefore, the 
potential use of proxy access is still unclear.230 In order to anticipate the
future of proxy access in the U.S., one may look to proxy access and similar
policies in other countries.231 Several countries have adopted policies enabling
greater influence to minority shareholders through various means.232 Each 
of these policies gives shareholders greater or lesser rights than that of 
other policies in accordance with the specific corporate governance structure 
of the particular nation.233 Some of the policies do not enable proxy access, 
while others influence through similar means to allow shareholders a
greater voice in nominating directors.234 Evidence from each country suggests
that even with policies in place, proxy access is infrequently utilized.235 
Additionally, even in countries where proxy access has been used more
frequently, the success rate is still very low.236  The Chartered Financial
Analyst (“CFA”) Institute, a global association of investors, released data 
reporting that: 
[P]roxy access is a rarely used shareowner right that is typically used only when
other outlets for shareowner concerns about a company or its board—such as 
engagement between shareholders and companies—have been exhausted or have
otherwise proved unfruitful.237 
A. Limited Proxy Access
The current popular practice in Canada involves selecting nominees 
through an independent nominating committee of the board.238 This practice 
most similarly mirrors the current nominating practice in most U.S. 
companies that have not yet adopted proxy access policies.239 The slate of 
candidates provided through these independent committees typically reflect 
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interest.240 In contrast to the U.S., Canadian law currently affords shareholders 
limited power of proxy access.241 A shareholder who owns 5% of a company’s
shares may either propose a meeting for shareholders to elect directors, or 
submit a proposal to include a specific nominee in the company’s proxy 
circular (essentially the proxy materials distributed annually to shareholders).242 
The main issue with the current law is that the treatment of nominees in
the company’s proxy circular remains inconsistent with the treatment of 
nominees by the board or by an independent committee.243 The law itself 
explicitly allows companies to treat shareholder nominated nominees differently
and essentially poorer than nominees made by the board. 
[T]here is no statutory requirement for the corporation to include information
about the shareholder’s nominee in the circular in an equitable manner in the same 
location as the company’s nominees with the same prominence; there is no
requirement to use a fair universal proxy form; and the shareholder proponent is
restricted to a 500-word statement in support of the proposal, whereas the length
of management’s response is unrestricted.244 
As a result, shareholders nominate only a limited number of candidates 
compared to the board or independent committees.245 Currently, proxy 
access in Canada has been utilized only once in three years.246 
In response to the inequalities shareholders face in the nominating 
process, the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance (“CCGG”) proposed
a reform in 2015. The CCGG promotes good governance practices in
corporations owned by its members, commonly corporations that trade in 
the S&P 500 or the Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”).247 In May 2015, 
the CCGG proposed corporations permit shareholders with a “meaningful 
percentage” of shares the ability to nominate directors through a corporation’s 
proxy materials.248 The proposal significantly mirrors revoked SEC rule 14a­
11, as the proposal suggests setting a threshold requirement of owning a
“meaningful percentage”–5% of outstanding shares in a corporation with a 
“market capitalization of less than $1 billion” and 3% of outstanding shares 
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The CCGG seeks to use this threshold to provide shareholders with a
mechanism to influence the nomination of the board while avoiding the 
risk of giving shareholders too much power.250 Additionally, much like
the U.S., the proposal permits shareholders to aggregate their ownership 
in order to meet the threshold requirements.251 Furthermore, the proposal
requires shareholders to continue to own the required shares until the time 
of the meeting when nominees will be considered.252 Overall, the proposal
highlights many of the threshold procedures that enable shareholders
to utilize their rights; yet, the proposal fails to address the risks associated
with increased shareholder power given to investors with short-term
interests.253 
B. No Ownership Threshold for Nominations
Other countries have adopted more protective policies through means 
different than proxy access that still accomplish similar goals.254 One of 
the main reasons proxy access policies in the U.S. contain ownership
thresholds and ownership periods is to avoid frivolous nominations by
shareholders with an unsubstantial interest in the company.255 These perceived 
risks are not necessarily mirrored in other countries though.256 Instead, 
countries such as Germany and Australia provide shareholders with
significantly larger amounts of authority than policies in the U.S. afford 
shareholders.257 
Germany has one of the most shareholder protective policies, as a
shareholder that owns any number of shares has the ability to nominate a 
director by providing a statement no longer than 500 words in support of 
the candidate.258 
In Australia, the articles of incorporation of each individual company 
dictates the policy governing board nominations.259 Typically, in most public 
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able to nominate one board candidate through proxy access procedures.260 
Proxy access has been used eleven times in 2016, but has only been
used successfully once.261 
C. Nominations by Minority Shareholder(s) Committees
Another example of favorable shareholder policies is Sweden. Sweden 
does not implement proxy access procedures, but instead creates a
nominating committee that is responsible for nominating candidates that 
the shareholders then vote on to elect.262 The nominating committee consists
of four or five of the company’s largest shareholders and the chair of the
board.263 Together, the committee also recommends criteria for selecting 
members of the nominating committee for the following year.264 
D. Line or Slate Voting
Italy and Brazil present an intermediary system profoundly different
from proxy access in the U.S. but share the same underlying goal of granting 
a voice to minority shareholders.265 
Italy has implemented a list voting system that allows minority 
shareholders to present a list of candidates for the election of the board.266 
The Italian legislature first introduced list voting in 1998, but the legislature 
limited shareholder influence to only the board of statutory auditors–a 
body separate from the board.267 In 2005, the legislature extended list voting 
to enable shareholder appointment of directors.268 
In general, a list voting system allows shareholders, often owning around 
1.5% of the company, to nominate directors of the board.269 Although the
exact procedures of this system vary significantly from proxy access, the 
goal of increasing minority shareholder influence remains consistent.270 
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shares can nominate board members through a list of nominees.271 As
required by statute, shareholders may present a list of board nominees; the 
lists are then voted on and the nominees on the list that receives the highest 
votes are elected.272 Additionally, at least one nominee from the other list 
that receives the second highest votes is elected.273 These committees vary 
from the nominating committees in the U.S. comprised of board members
as instead these committees place power in the hands of the shareholders,
even if merely the largest, yet still minority, shareholders. 
Through this system, institutional investors are able to obtain a voice
since institutional investors receive significant support for the lists they
present at the shareholders’ annual general meeting.274 Accordingly institutional 
investors are often able to obtain votes from minority investors.275 
Similarly, in Brazil, directors are elected as part of slates presented by 
management or a nominating committee.276 An aggregated group of
shareholders representing 15% of the company’s common shares may
petition to nominate one candidate in a separate election.277 There is no 
individual threshold requirement of shareholders to petition for a separate 
election, instead, the aggregate of shareholders must meet the 15% 
requirement.278 
E. Comparing International Policies to the U.S.
A noticeable shift exists indicating many nations favor adopting 
countrywide standards regarding shareholder protective policies.279 The
variety of policies among countries can be attributed to factors such as the 
type of companies affected, the makeup of shareholders within publicly
traded companies, and the popular corporate governance structure within
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to policies of other nations, each is very distinct.281 Policies with no 
qualification requirements for shareholders, list/slate voting systems, or 
nominating committee systems each differ to meet the country’s view of 
shareholder rights and the cultural makeup of the nation.282 
Generally, enforcement of a uniform policy throughout a country creates 
stability and cohesion between corporations within the country.283 Without a
uniform policy, companies are left to follow corporate governance trends 
without really understanding the impact policies might have on a corporation’s 
long-term health.284 The corporate trends cause companies to adopt varying 
policies as each corporation chooses policies it determines are most
beneficial.285 In the U.S., many corporations have adopted policies similar
to the SEC’s revoked rule 14a-11; however, some corporations have chosen
to adopt policies that only roughly reflect the rule by lowering threshold 
requirements and removing aggregation limits.286 Following the DC Circuit 
revoking rule 14a-11, the SEC is likely to continue to refrain from establishing 
any proxy access mandates.287 Although a universal policy may establish
consistency within U.S. corporations, it is unlikely to be promulgated.288 
Therefore, companies are left to determine individually whether proxy 
access is beneficial or not. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
This section will address the current state of proxy access in the U.S.
and the potential solutions to solve perceived issues with proxy access. 
Specifically, this section will evaluate the debate over proxy access by
looking specifically to which shareholders qualify for proxy access and
the consequences of giving these shareholders more power within companies.
Proponents of proxy access believe that increasing shareholder 
participation in selection of the board benefits the corporation and is 
necessary to maintain shareholder democracy.289 In contrast, opponents
often view increased shareholder influence as a means to facilitate hostile 
take-overs–essentially, allowing shareholders to take over control of the 
board.290 In turn, obtaining an accurate balance between enabling shareholder 
281. See id.
 282. See id.
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power while maintaining board control is one of the major difficulties 
facing proxy access policies.291 Thus, before adopting proxy access bylaws,
companies should evaluate on a case-by-case basis the specific provisions
of proxy access proposals to determine if the proposed policies are in-line 
with the company’s interests.292 
There is little worry that institutions will use proxy access policies to 
obtain short-term return because of the longevity of the holding periods 
that most proxy access proposals require.293 But it is still something that
should be considered. A variety of institutional investors may qualify for 
proxy access, including some investors that may not benefit the long-term
interests of the corporation.294 Thus, the specific investors able to engage
in proxy access voting are relevant to evaluating the costs and benefits of 
enabling proxy access.295 Not all institutional investors may positively
impact corporations when given greater voices.296 Specifically, institutions 
aimed at obtaining short-term gains, like transient investors, may influence 
the corporation to engage in short-term behavior through first altering the
board.297 Similarly, managers may also engage in short-term behavior in
an effort to preempt shareholders from using proxy access voting to replace
members of the board.298 
It is suggested that shorter-term investors could attempt to use proxy
access by finding like-minded shareholders that are eligible for using proxy 
access.299 In an age of social media, the threat of shareholders grouping
 291. See Human, supra note 75. 
292. See Copland & O’Keefe, supra note 55. 
293. Human, supra note 75. 
294. See id.
 295. See Dallas, supra note 5, at 304–05. For example, one of Coca-Cola’s top investors 
Berkshire Hathaway would likely provide substantial benefit to a corporation if given a 
greater voice in the corporation. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, Berkshire’s 
Disintermediation: A Managerial Model For The Next Generation, 50 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 509, 509–11 (2015). Berkshire Hathaway, Warren Buffet’s corporation, has a prominent
reputation for implementing positive measure in many of the corporations in which it owns 
shares. Id. at 510. “Berkshire’s formal governance is headed by Buffett’s handpicked 
board of directors—his friends and family, who pride themselves more for being just like 
shareholders than on serving as monitors of management for them. Berkshire’s shareholder 
body embraces the company’s unusual approach to corporate governance and concurs with 
Buffett’s aversion to intermediaries.” Id.
 296. See Dallas & Barry, supra note 30, at 563. 
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together is possible, but it is also very unlikely.300 Putting caps on the amount 
of shareholders that may aggregate together easily solves this issue.301 
Therefore, shareholders interested in utilizing proxy access must still own 
a reasonable amount of shares as only roughly twenty shareholders may
typically group together.302 
Overall, the general view is that proxy access will be infrequently used.303 
Not many shareholders will meet the requirements; therefore utilizing 
proxy access will take considerable work on the part of the interested
shareholders to find other shareholders to support their nomination.304 
This is partially due to the fact that proxy access is not actually useful
unless the nominating shareholder can actually win the vote to get their
candidate on the board.305 Proxy access is therefore more of a last resort 
option that certain shareholders may utilize when it is necessary.306 
Thus, although establishing a universal proxy access policy is possible,
there is no need to do so. Instead, recent activity indicates that the best
approach is to allow companies to shape proxy access proposals on a case­
by-case basis to meet their own specific interests.307 Moreover, when activists
and managers have dueling proposals, the proposal in the company’s best
interests is likely to be selected.308 Furthermore, although the SEC could
potentially establish a baseline proxy access policy, such a policy is also
unnecessary.309 Given the issues presented by the revoked SEC rule 14a­
11, it is likely not an easy solution.310 A subsequent rule might also too be
overturned. Instead, the best option is to allow corporations to continue
engaging in proxy access policy adoption at their own pace and under their
own consideration of factors.311 
Accordingly, it is in the best interest of companies to proactively adopt
policies that meet their goals rather than wait for shareholders to propose 
a policy. In contrast, from the perspective of shareholders, shareholders
who are among like-minded shareholders should propose a policy that
meets their aggregated group’s goals. As previously stated, proxy access
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those who can aggregate together. Therefore, it is vital for long term investors 
and pension funds to be among like-minded shareholders to not only aggregate 
together, but also to succeed in implementing meaningful change in the 
company.
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